

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

8 October 1976

NOTE FOR: All PAID Staffers

SUBJECT: Tentative Work Program for CIPIB

Attached is food for thought, discus-
sion for next week's meeting at W [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

Tentative Work Program for Crisis Intelligence
and Product Improvement Branch
(October 76 - April 77)

New efforts:

- Define the ICS' (Crisis Intelligence Branch's) role in Warning and Crisis
 - What are its functions/responsibilities in a crisis?

Staff - Monitoring (during) and reviewing (after)?
or

Line - Tasking and coordinating?
 - What is its relationship to:
 - DCI's "Crisis Coordinator?"
 - Special Assistant for Warning and Crisis?
 - Military Commands?
 - Lower level consumers?
 - What support should it provide to DCI/IC in his responsibility to "monitor functions of the Strategic Warning process?" (DCID 1/5)
 - How does it "improve product?"
- Develop new, improved analytical methods for I&W analysis, e.g., foreign behavior pattern recognition; integrated intelligence analysis to detect cumulative changes over periods of time; display and presentation of analyses and forecasts; more precise system for expressing uncertainty and probability in reporting.
- Develop new procedures for reporting/systems which support warning process (e.g., CONTEXT, National Sitrep, etc.)

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- Promote wider dissemination/understanding of warning and crisis related procedures, systems, concepts:
 - Get wide distribution made of CRITIC Handbook to CIA, State and other USG field elements.
 - Educate USG to importance of CRITIC system and other warning related doctrine--work into training programs for attaches, agents, embassy officers, FBIS field personnel, etc.
 - Encourage visits between ops center personnel (IC and non-IC); help to develop an ops center officer training program
- Visit military commands plus other field elements (CIA stations, major SIGINT elements, etc.) to:
 - inform on IC systems, procedures, national-level policies related to warning/crisis
 - get understanding of intel operations and activities supporting command and value of departmental and national intelligence in satisfying command needs
 - discuss, help solve any problems related to intel support, e.g., compartmentation, communications, J2/J3 relations, etc.
- Develop systems, procedures for tasking and coordinating IC collection and analysis during crises, e.g., for new technical collection system becoming operational this fall:
 - How are requirements to be developed and levied?
 - How will priorities be determined?
 - How will analysts use and report data?

Continuing efforts:

- Host semiannual (?) ops center conferences:
 - Next one in December at FPA on "National Nervous System Directory?"

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- Invite wider participation--Intelligence and non-Intelligence Community; field commands?
- Revise and monitor, ensure compliance with all existing procedural directives (e.g., CRITIC Handbook, DCID 771, Alert Memoranda, Strategic Warning Notices, NOIWON, etc.) which support warning process.
- Define DCI's role in warning, crisis and wartime:
 - To establish clear and formally recognized control over IC collection and production
 - To provide for continued intelligence support to national authorities during all periods from crisis to war.
- Conduct post mortems and prepare mini-reviews of reporting and functioning of IC during crises and other special situations (see discussion attached):
 - When?--self-initiated or only upon request?
 - Who?--Crisis Branch? PEB? Both? Task Force?
 - Where?--PAID?--Special Task Force area? New building?
- Participate in semiannual NSC review?
- Promote closer producer/user interface and greater flow of policy/operational information to improve warning analysis:
 - Get State to provide NODIS/EXDIS cables to IC on regular basis. National Sitrep a start.
 - Get J3 to provide military operation information to IC on regular basis.
 - Get policymaker/operator personally involved in warning analysis process--make him aware of benefits
 - Establish continuing IC dialogue with policymaker/operators:
 - Joint conferences
 - Policymaker/operator guest speaker programs

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

The Post-Mortem Question

Post mortems were once PAID's (PRD's) principal product but are they now a thing of the past? Have we moved into a new, less controversial era (the NSC review, etc.)? Should the ICS continue to conduct post mortems and other special reviews of IC performance and, if so, should they be limited to reviewing only the operational aspects of the IC performance (how well did the system function?) and not the Community's analytical judgments which always draw heaviest fire?

Points to Consider

Pro:

- Post mortems are the most useful means IC has developed to identify problems, deficiencies and corrective actions needed. But easier to fix systemic/procedural problems than analytical ones.
- PMs can also lead to development of new systems, procedures which help to improve IC efficiency and performance in both crisis and non-crisis periods (e.g., NOIWON, CONTEXT, CRITIC SOPs Handbook, etc.).

Con:

- Time and manpower requirements of PMs are very high. Past major PMs (Middle East, Cyprus, Mayaguez) have taken 3-15 people, 2-4 months full time. Crisis Intelligence Branch (3 people) could not do alone. Would have to join with PEB (at expense of other missions) or form special task force such as done for NSC review.
- PMs very unpopular with IC which is sensitive to criticism, defensive about mistakes. No PMs produced or requested since 1975 congressional leaks and unfavorable publicity. What is DCI and DCI/IC policy on PMs?

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100030002-0

SECRET

- PMs of questionable long-term benefit. Lessons learned don't stay learned. (Short "institutional memory" problem.) Spotty record on follow-up corrective actions: e.g., poor for Middle East PM; good for Mayaguez PM. Also, ICS is only element that took corrective actions. NFIB (USIB) members traditionally indifferent to PMs. Have shown no interest in ensuring that IC takes corrective actions or report on status of efforts.
- Lack of space or specific area to perform PMs. Need access to ops centers for observing IC operations during crisis. Problem will become greater when ICS moves.

SECRET